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1. Introduction 
1.1. Abstract  
Public pension systems face a financing challenge over the long run, as population is aging. 
One benefit of Notional Defined Contributions (NDC) pension systems is that their financing 
is sustainable by design, as they equalize average lifetime social security contributions with 
average lifetime pension benefits, even when population is aging. Using an overlapping-
generations model with endogenous labor supply decisions, three skill levels and skill-
dependent mortality, this report investigates reform options for the implementation of a NDC 
system in Austria. Adjustments to implement a NDC system would be significant, even under 
a constant population: the social security contribution rate for low-skilled workers would need 
to be increased more than 7 percentage points, their pension benefits cut more than 40 
percent or their effective retirement age increased more than 8 years. Whether or not the 
implementation of a NDC system has a positive impact on GDP depends on the exact 
reform. Variations in retirement age have the most positive impact. When a NDC pension 
system is implemented, tax policies to support low-income households can also be 
performed at a small macroeconomic cost. 
 
1.2. Motivation and approach 
Two observations motivate the analysis of Notional Defined Contributions (NDC) pension 
systems: financial challenges due to population aging and incentive effects of redistribution 
via pensions. On the one hand, NDC pension systems are financially sustainable. On the 
other hand, the redistribution currently embedded in the Austrian pension system would 
disappear if it was transformed into a NDC system, unless the tax and transfer system was 
changed at the same time. 
Declining fertility and increasing longevity leads to a slow aging of the population. According 
to projections from Statistik Austria, the old-age dependency ratio1 should increase from 27% 
in 2010 to almost 50% in 2060. Without social security reforms, the ratio of active workers 
over retired workers will sharply decrease, a challenge for the financing of public pensions, 
healthcare and long-term care expenditures. Most European countries face this challenge 
and have been considering pension reforms to deal with it (Ageing Working Group, 2012). 
Further reforms are needed. Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010) for instance 
estimated in 2010 that the deficit of pension financing in Austria would move from 2.5% of 
GDP in 2010 to 10% of GDP in 2050 if no reform was undertaken. 
                                                     
1
 The old-age dependency ratio is the size of the population older than 65 years over the size of the population aged 
between 15 and 64 years. 
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Redistribution from high-income to low-income households takes place via different 
channels. The most visible channel is the tax schedule, which is progressive in most 
developed countries. Another less visible channel is the pension system. The contribution 
and benefit rates differ indeed by income level. Figure 1 shows that in almost all OECD 
countries, the benefit replacement rate is larger for low-income households. For instance, 
workers earning half the average wage can expect to receive a pension payment which 
amounts to 91% of the wage in Austria; for workers earnings twice the average wage, the 
benefit replacement rate is 66%. 
Figure 1: Pensions Net Replacement Rate, Selected Income Classes, Europe, 2012  
 
Source: OECD (ELS Pensions Dataset, 2012) 
Social security contributions on the other hand often come with a maximum amount, 
mitigating the redistributive nature of pension systems. 
The goal of the study is to evaluate NDC pension systems in the Austrian context. In doing 
so, I will also quantify the public finance and macroeconomic impact of redistribution through 
the existing pension system. Because of the financing challenge that population aging 
represents, the study will provide evaluations with constant population and with an aging 
population.  
In technical terms, the report considers reforms which shift the current defined-benefit (DB) 
pension system to a notional defined contribution (NDC) system. While payments are 
defined by the benefit amount irrespective of life expectancy in the first case, they depend on 
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life expectancy in the second case: with a NDC system, the payment is defined so that the 
average (past) total contributions over the working life equals the total benefit payments over 
the remaining (future, uncertain and expected) lifetime after retirement. As a result, 
population aging leads to deficits in a DB system without reforms. By design, a NDC system 
never generates deficits, with a constant or an aging population. 
To give a concrete measure of the degree of redistribution embedded in the pension system, 
the study defines reforms to remove intragenerational redistribution. Concretely, we look for 
the pension reform that is needed so that the average lifetime social security contributions 
(dedicated to pension financing) for a given skill class is equal to the average lifetime 
pension benefits received. In other words, the study is looking for the pension reform that is 
needed so that the pension system is transformed into a NDC system2. I consider the three 
standard pension parametric reforms (changes in social security contributions, pension 
payments or retirement age), which gives three different measures of the degree of 
redistribution. 
To perform the analysis, the IHS overlapping-generations model TaxLab is used. TaxLab is 
an overlapping-generations model of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) type with three skill 
classes. Labor supply is endogenous along intensive and extensive margins, to better 
capture the distortive costs of redistribution. Because contributions depend on 
unemployment, the model takes employment status into account, following the approach of 
Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010). As in Fehr, Kallweit, and Kindermann (2012) life 
duration is uncertain and depends on the skill level, a critical feature for the evaluation of 
redistribution from low-skilled towards high-skilled households. The core model is routinely 
used for policy evaluations3. 
 
1.3. Results summary 
The gains from implementing a pure NDC system, without associated change in the tax 
system, depend on the actual reform. Implementing a NDC system with variations of social 
security contributions leads to 0.4% lower GDP, while variations of pension payments lead to 
a small 1.4% gain and changes in retirement age boost GDP by 7.7%. 
To transform the pension system into a NDC system (and thus remove redistribution from the 
pension system), the needed pension reforms are large and differ by skill class. The social 
security contribution rate for the low-skilled households should increase from an average of 
15.9 to 23.3%, while that of the high-skilled should decrease from 15.0 to 14.8%. Or, pension 
                                                     
2
 See Sánchez-Romero, Sambt, and Prskawetz (2013) for an analysis of public finance and growth properties of 
NDC pensions in Austria. 
3
 See for instance Davoine, Keuschnigg and Schuster (2014). 
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benefits should be cut in average 43% for the low-skilled and increase 4% for the high-skilled 
households. Or, the effective retirement age for the low-skilled should increase from 58 to 66 
years, while that of the high-skilled households should drop from 62 to 59.5 years. Needed 
reforms are larger when population aging is taken into account. 
Depending on the reform, gains in general can be positive or negative. Further, they can be 
larger for low-skilled or larger for high-skilled households. Consumption per capita for an 
average low-skilled household drops when social security contributions are raised or when 
pension payment modified. In contrast, it increases more than the consumption of other 
households when the retirement age is changed.   
The study also shows that redistributive tax policy can lead to identical consumption impacts 
across skill classes, in proportional terms, at a small macroeconomic cost. For instance, 
variations in pension payments can be combined with transfers to low- and middle-skilled 
households so that consumption per capita increases in the same proportion (2%) for all 
households. This policy change would limit output gains to 0.2% (instead of 1.4%, when 
there are no transfers). 
 
 
2. Model 
Analysis is performed with IHS’ overlapping-generations (OLG) model, TaxLab, introduced in 
Berger, Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg, Miess, Strohner, and Winter-Ebmer (2009). This section 
presents the main features of TaxLab. Details are contained in the technical appendix 
Davoine (2015), available upon request.  
TaxLab is a single-sector, single-country dynamic OLG model with three skill levels, several 
margins of labor supply and detailed public institutions. The behavior of agents relies on 
micro foundations. Households endogenously decide on skill levels (education), continuous 
training efforts, participation in the labor market, search effort if unemployed, hours supplied 
and retirement date, as well as the intertemporal allocation of their consumption. TaxLab 
allows for three skill levels, eight different generations and further unobserved heterogeneity 
in labor income. Households are forward-looking and maximize expected lifetime utility 
subject to a budget constraint. Specifically, households of age group  ∈ {1, … ,8} and skill 
class  ∈ {,, ℎ} solve the following maximization problem: 
, = max ,	

+ 
,, 	



. . 
,, = , + , − ,	
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where ,  is the expected remaining life-time utility of the household at time ,  defines the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution,   is a time discounting factor, ,  is effort-adjusted 
consumption,  = 1 +  is the gross factor of growth by which the model is detrended, ,  
represent assets, ,  are net income flows, ,  is goods consumption and  = 1 +  is the 
gross interest rate.   
Profit-maximizing firms make capital investment decisions, hire, train and fire workers. 
Wages are set by bilateral bargaining between workers and firms. In the model, there is one 
type of good, output of a production process which combines capital and three skill types of 
labor. In line with empirical evidence, there is capital-skill complementarity in production, low-
skilled workers being substituted more easily by capital than medium- and high-skilled 
workers.  
The government raises revenues by taxing consumption, profits, labor and capital income as 
well as by payroll taxes and social security contributions on both workers’ and firms’ sides. 
Revenues are used to provide welfare benefits, unemployment insurance, pay-as-you-go 
pensions and investment subsidies. Government expenditures also include public 
consumption, long-term care and health expenditures, all defined exogenously in per capita 
terms and generating no utility. Long-term care and health expenditures are age-dependent. 
Pension payments have a flat anti-poverty part and an earnings-related part. 
Calibration of the model is performed in a standard fashion, relying on empirical estimates 
and micro databases. Specific parameters for this study all relate to projections of 
demographics and social security reforms. Calibration for these parameters is described in 
more details below.  
Skill-independent demographic projections from the Austrian statistical office (Statistik 
Austria) are used to set net migration and fertility rates over time. Age-dependent mortality 
rates for medium-skilled households are chosen to match the projected age distribution. 
Klotz and Asamer (2014) show that households aged 35 in 2012 have a life expectancy of 
80.0 if they are low-skilled, 82.0 medium-skilled and 84.3 high-skilled. I assume that the 
difference relative to the medium-skilled remains constant over time (-2.4% for the low-
skilled, +2.9% for the high-skilled) to derive the age-dependent mortality rates for the low- 
and high-skilled households.  
Future variations in individual contribution rates, pension payouts and average retirement 
age are taken from the Ageing Working Group (2012) and used in a status quo scenario: 
compared to 2010, the contribution rate is unchanged in 2060, the pension gross 
replacement rate is 21.8% lower and the retirement age 1.7 years larger4. Total factor 
                                                     
4
 As the pension reforms decided in April 2012 are not taken into account in the Ageing Working Group (2012), I 
apply a further correction. I translate the partial inflation indexation measures and the modifications of penalties for 
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productivity growth as well as per capita health and long-term care expenditures projections 
are taken from the same source5.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
early retirement (mostly used by low-skill households) into an additional skill-dependent and gradual reduction of the 
gross replacement rate comprised between 1.8% and 4.8%. 
5
 The Ageing Working Group (2012) assumes that yearly TFP growth is 1.4% and that health- and long-term care 
expenditures increase from 9 % of GDP in 2010 to 11.8% if GDP in 2060, in their reference scenario. 
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3. Quantitative results 
The first part of the experiments focuses on pure NDC pension systems, which allows 
quantifying the cost of redistribution which takes place via pensions. The second part 
focuses on policy design, with mixed pension and tax reforms.  
As the calibration of the model is made with projections from the Ageing Working Group 
(2012) and they report values between 2010 and 2060, simulations are performed for the 
same time horizon. 
3.1. Effects of pure NDC pension systems  
Table 1 displays the main results of this subsection. It shows what reform would be 
necessary to implement a pure NDC system and thus remove redistribution from the 
Austrian pension system, either through a change in social contribution rates, a change in 
pension benefits or a change in the retirement age. In all cases, population is constant, to 
focus on redistribution effects. Any public finance saving of a reform is provided back to 
households in the form of lower labor income taxes (holding public debt per capita constant): 
because the current pension system is subsidized by the government budget and because a 
move to a NDC system would make the system financially sustainable, it would no longer be 
necessary to subsidize the pension system with the government budget; what the 
government budget would gain is to be transferred to the households in the form of lower 
labor income taxes, so that the public debt per capita remains unchanged.   
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Table 1: Reforms for a NDC pension system, no population aging 
  ISS Higher Pension Ret 
  SSC Cuts Age 
 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Demographics 
        
Population (15+) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Dependency Ratio 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 
Labor Market 
        
Effective retirement age 59.4 59.4 59.4 62.8 
     - low skill 57.8 57.8 57.8 66.0 
     - med skill 59.1 59.1 59.1 63.1 
     - high skill 61.8 61.8 61.8 59.3 
Unemployment rate 5.5 5.8 5.1 5.1 
Participation rate 55.4 55.3 55.7 60.3 
Work hours (yearly hours / worker) 1,623 1,621 1,628 1,624 
Effective employment (yearly h. / capita) 850 844 861 929 
Gross wages (%) - 0.5 -0.4 -1.9 
Macroeconomics 
        
GDP/capita (%) - -0.4 1.4 7.7 
Consumption/capita (%) - -0.8 2.6 14.0 
     - low skill  (%) - -7.4 -1.8 32.3 
     - med skill  (%) - -1.3 1.9 7.6 
     - high skill  (%) - 3.5 6.2 22.8 
Assets/ capita (%) - -1.1 5.3 16.5 
     
Public Finance 
        
Average pension payment (%) - -2.4 -18.8 7.1 
     - low skill  (%) - -5.4 -43.0 8.9 
     - med skill  (%) - -2.3 -22.3 3.0 
     - high skill  (%) - -1.0 3.6 8.4 
Average Worker SSC rate 15.9 19.5 15.9 15.9 
     - low skill 15.9 23.3 15.9 15.9 
     - med skill 16.1 19.5 16.1 16.1 
     - high skill 15.0 14.8 15.0 15.0 
Average lifetime pension (Ben.-Contrib.)/Ben.     
     - low skill 43.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     - med skill 22.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
     - high skill -5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average Labor Income Tax rate 15.6 10.9 9.9 6.2 
     - low skill 9.6 4.9 3.9 0.2 
     - med skill 15.7 11.0 10.0 6.3 
     - high skill 22.4 17.7 16.7 13.0 
     
Legend: ISS = Initial Steady State, describing the current Austrian economy; SSC = Social Security 
Contributions; Ret Age = Retirement age variations; (%) = percentage change compared to ISS value. 
Experiment: change in social security contributions, pension benefits or retirement age so that 
Average lifetime pension (Ben-Contrib)/Ben = 0 by skill class, that is: average lifetime pension benefits 
equals average lifetime contributions to finance pensions. 
Source: simulations with IHS TaxLab Model 
To remove redistribution via pensions, the system is reformed until the average lifetime 
contributions for the pension system equals the average lifetime benefits received, within 
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each skill class6. When this is achieved, the pension system is equivalent to a NDC system. 
The first column of the table shows key characteristics of the current Austrian pension 
system, for comparison purposes.  
The second column shows the changes in social security contributions needed to implement 
a NDC system. The average rate needs to be increased from 15.9% to 23.3% for low-skilled 
households in order to equalize their average lifetime contributions with benefits. An increase 
to 19.5% for medium-skilled households is sufficient. The rate should decline from 15.0% to 
14.8% for the high-skilled. This shows that high-skilled households contribute in average 
more to the pension system than they benefit from it, over their lifetime. Low-skilled 
households on the other hand benefit more from the pension system than they contribute. 
This illustrates the redistribution which takes place through the pension system from high- to 
low- and medium-skilled households. 
Because deficits of the pension system would be eliminated, labor income taxes could be 
decreased. The associated decrease (4.7 percentage point) then reduces the negative 
impact of the reform on the net wage for the low- and medium-skilled households, but not 
enough to compensate the loss due to the increase in the social security contribution rate. In 
average thus, the new wage declines, reducing incentives to provide labor supply (each 
worker provides in average 2 hours less of labor).   
The third column shows the pension benefit reforms needed to remove redistribution from 
the pension system: one can equalize average lifetime contributions with benefits by 
decreasing pension benefits 43% for the low-skilled and 22% for the medium-skilled, while 
increasing benefits almost 4% for the high-skilled.  
In the fourth column, an alternative reform is considered. Increasing the retirement age from 
58 to 66 years for the low-skilled would also equalize their average lifetime contributions and 
benefits7. For medium-skilled households, an increase from 59 to 63 years would be 
sufficient, while a decrease of 2.5 years for high-skilled households would be needed.  
In all three reforms considered, efforts fall mostly on the low-skilled households, followed by 
the medium-skilled households: their pension benefits decline most, social security 
contributions rate increase most and retirement age increase most. There are two reasons 
for such outcomes. First, the effective retirement age of the low-skilled is smaller: they retire 
in average 4 years earlier8 than the high-skilled in 2010, and thus stop their financial 
                                                     
6
 In table 1, when Average lifetime pension (Ben.-Contrib.)/Ben = 0. 
7
 In line with Börsch-Supan (2013), I also assume that workplace conditions and health improvements allow workers 
around retirement age (55 to 69 years old) to become gradually as fit (smaller disability risk) for work as prime-age 
workers (40 to 55 years old). 
8
 The model also takes differences in education duration into account. While low-skilled workers leave the education 
system sooner and thus enter the labor market sooner, the unemployment rate in this segment of the population is 
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contribution to the social security system sooner. Second, at 91%, the pension replacement 
rate is higher for the low-skilled, compared to 69% for the high-skilled. After retirement, low-
skilled households perceive larger benefits, relative to the wage they were earning. 
The table also provides labor market and macroeconomic impacts of the reforms. When the 
retirement age is changed, there is a mechanical impact of the reform9 on the labor supply 
(which increases from an average 850 yearly hours per capita to 929). Production then 
increases, leading to a GDP per capita increase of nearly 8%. In contrast, with the 
disincentive effects of the social contribution variations (which increases in average 3.5 
percentage points) on labor supply (see above), production drops and GDP per capita 
follows (-0.4%). The pension variations reform is an intermediate case, with a minor increase 
of GDP per capita (+1.4%).  
Except for the retirement age reform, average consumption per capita for the low-skilled 
households drops more than for other households, because pension benefits cuts, 
respectively increases in social security contributions, are larger for the low-skilled, reducing 
their net lifetime income. By contrast, consumption per capita increases most for the low-
skilled households when the retirement age is reformed. The larger increase in retirement 
age for these households leads to a larger increase in lifetime labor supply, net income and 
thus consumption opportunities. These outcomes will be important for practical policy reform 
options, investigated in the next section. 
Table 2 provides the same analysis but with an aging population, showing outcomes 50 
years later. For comparison, the table also provides the effect of population aging and 
scheduled pension reforms alone (second column), where the increase in social security 
expenditures (pensions, health- and long-term care) is financed with higher labor income 
taxes. 
  
                                                                                                                                                      
large and the wages relatively lower. The social security contribution of young and low-skilled workers is thus low 
compared to contributions from other categories of workers. 
9
 There is also an indirect incentive effect: the resulting decrease in labor income taxes stimulates participation, job 
search and work hours. 
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Table 2: Reforms for a NDC pension system, with population aging 
  ISS Aging  Higher Pension Ret 
  Alone SSC Cuts Age 
 2010 2060 2060 2060 2060 
 
Demographics 
         
Population (15+) 100.0 114.5 114.5 114.5 114.5 
Dependency Ratio 26.3 48.1 48.1 48.1 48.1 
 
Labor Market 
         
Effective retirement age 59.4 61.1 61.1 61.1 66.6 
     - low skill 57.8 59.5 59.5 59.5 68.6 
     - med skill 59.1 60.8 60.8 60.8 66.9 
     - high skill 61.8 63.5 63.5 63.5 64.0 
Unemployment rate 5.5 6.6 7.3 5.8 4.1 
Participation rate 55.4 48.1 47.8 48.6 57.4 
Work hours (yearly hours / worker) 1,623 1,602 1,597 1,613 1,634 
Effective employment (yearly h. / capita) 850 720 707 738 896 
Gross wages (%) - 3.5 4.5 2.2 -1.4 
 
Macroeconomics 
         
GDP/capita (%) - -13.4 -14.5 -11.5 12.2 
Consumption/capita (%) - -16.9 -18.4 -15.6 76.7 
     - low skill  (%) - -16.5 -22.3 -18.1 325.3 
     - med skill  (%) - -16.8 -18.5 -16.0 61.2 
     - high skill  (%) - -17.5 -16.5 -13.6 8.7 
Assets/ capita (%) - 16.3 13.9 21.9 77.7 
  
 
   
Public Finance 
         
Average pension payment (%) - -25.2 -27.0 -51.5 -20.5 
     - low skill  (%) - -27.4 -29.6 -66.4 -22.9 
     - med skill  (%) - -25.1 -26.4 -52.7 -22.6 
     - high skill  (%) - -23.7 -24.9 -40.6 -23.1 
Average Worker SSC rate 15.9 15.9 23.2 15.9 15.9 
     - low skill 15.9 15.9 27.2 15.9 15.9 
     - med skill 16.1 16.1 23.1 16.1 16.1 
     - high skill 15.0 15.0 18.6 15.0 15.0 
Average lifetime pension (Ben.-Contrib.)/Ben.      
     - low skill 43.6 53.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 
     - med skill 22.6 36.7 0.0 0.0 1.6 
     - high skill -5.8 22.1 0.0 0.0 -3.7 
Average Labor Income Tax rate 15.6 26.8 18.5 16.9 -10.1 
     - low skill 9.6 20.8 12.5 11.0 -16.1 
     - med skill 15.7 26.9 18.6 17.1 -10.0 
     - high skill 22.4 33.6 25.3 23.7 -3.3 
      
Legend: GDP/capita, consumption/capita and pension payment figures in 2060 are provided relative to 
the growth trend. See also table 1. 
Source: simulations with IHS TaxLab Model 
Qualitatively, outcomes are the same as in the case with no population aging, in table 1. As 
expected, the magnitude of the reform efforts, now needed to remove pension redistribution 
and finance the increase in social security expenditures at the same time, is greater. For 
instance, the increase in retirement age for the low-skilled households would be 10.8 years. 
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Because of the large impact on the labor supply (an increase of 46 hours per capita 
compared to 2010, instead of a decline of more than 100 hours for other scenarios), 
household lifetime income increases significantly. Absolute savings then mechanically 
increase, resulting in a 77% rise of per capita assets. Increase in capital income re-inforce 
the increase in household income due to labor supply expansion. Larger lifetime income then 
allows for higher lifetime consumption. The effect is particularly strong for low-skilled 
households, the retirement age increase being large for them.  
Summing up, there are three main results. First, the macroeconomic gain of implementing a 
NDC system depends on the actual pension design. GDP is lowest with a non-redistributing 
system balanced by social security contributions and highest when it is balanced by 
retirement age. Second, implementing a NDC system and thus removing redistribution from 
the Austrian pension system would require large adjustments, in particular for the low-skilled 
households, because the net pension replacement rate is higher for these households. Third, 
gains are larger for low-skilled households than other households with one reform which 
implements a NDC system, namely retirement age variations, and lower with the other two 
reforms. 
 
3.2. Reform options for NDC pension systems 
The previous section focused on redistribution within pension systems and considered 
theoretical reforms to implement NDC systems. This section builds on these theoretical 
results and investigates realistic reforms suitable for the policy debate.  
One benefit of NDC pension systems is that they are by design financially sustainable with 
an aging population. However, two outcomes make the implementation of a NDC system 
less attractive. First, the necessary reforms to have a NDC system require most efforts from 
low-skilled households For instance, the effective retirement age for low-skilled households 
should increase from 58 today to 69 years in 2060 when population is aging. Second, some 
reforms implementing a NDC system lead to (consumption) losses for low-skilled 
households.  
This section considers realistic reforms which could ease or eliminate these two drawbacks. 
For the first drawback, I consider a reform so that the pension system in Austria starts from a 
position comparable to the system in Germany. For the second drawback, I consider a 
reform which not only eliminates redistribution from the pension system, as was done in the 
previous section, but also shift redistribution (partially) to the tax system. I start with details 
and outcomes for reforms dealing with the first drawback, and continue with the second 
drawback. 
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3.2.1. Reform efforts 
One reason why reform efforts for low-skilled households are larger is that Austria offers a 
higher pension replacement rate for low-skilled than high-skilled households. Because of a 
higher replacement rate, the pension benefits compared to the wage and thus the social 
security contributions are large for low-skilled households. It follows that the average lifetime 
contributions are smaller than the average lifetime benefits. Because the difference is large, 
stronger reform efforts are needed for low-skilled households. 
In international comparison, the gap is large in Austria (see figure 1): the net replacement 
rate for low-income households (earning half the average) is larger than 90% and the one for 
high-income households (earning twice the average) is 65%. As Austria and Germany have 
similar labor market equilibriums and public policies as well as close cultural ties, 
implementing some features of German public policy in Austria is a realistic scenario. We 
thus consider an adjustment of the Austrian pension system so that it has the same 
replacement rates as in Germany. Because differentials in reform efforts across skill classes 
is large for retirement age variations, I focus on retirement age reforms and ignore social 
security contributions and pension cut reforms.  
Table 3 presents the outcome of the implementation of such a reform in 2010, followed by a 
removal of pension redistribution under population aging (columns 2, 4 and 6). For 
convenience, I include comparable outcomes with the actual Austrian replacement rates 
from table 2 (columns 1, 3 and 5).  
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Table 3: Replacement rates as in Germany and reforms needed for a NDC system  
  ISS DE  Aging DE Ret DE  
  NRR  NRR & Age NRR & 
    Aging  Ret Age 
 2010 2010 2060 2060 2060 2060 
    
Demographics 
         
Population (15+) 100.0 100.0 114.5 114.5 114.5 114.5 
Dependency Ratio 26.3 26.3 48.1 48.1 48.1 48.1 
     
Labor Market 
        
Effective retirement age 59.4 59.4 61.1 61.1 66.6 63.1 
     - low skill 57.8 57.8 59.5 59.5 68.6 64.2 
     - med skill 59.1 59.1 60.8 60.8 66.9 63.2 
     - high skill 61.8 61.8 63.5 63.5 64.0 61.8 
Unemployment rate 5.5 5.8 6.6 5.6 4.1 5.3 
Participation rate 55.4 55.1 48.1 48.7 57.4 51.4 
Work hours (/worker) 1,623 1,617 1,602 1,614 1,634 1,614 
Effective employment (hrs./capita) 850 839 720 741 896 786 
Gross wages (%) - 0.4 3.5 2.4 -1.4 1.0 
 
 
   
Macroeconomics 
        
GDP/capita (%) - -0.9 -13.4 -9.5 12.2 -5.0 
Consumption/capita (%) - 1.8 -16.9 -12.9 76.7 -5.3 
     - low skill  (%) - 5.0 -16.5 -15.5 325.3 3.6 
     - med skill  (%) - 1.6 -16.8 -12.6 61.2 -6.9 
     - high skill  (%) - 0.8 -17.5 -13.4 8.7 -6.3 
Assets/ capita (%) - 10.5 16.3 14.3 77.7 17.0 
  
  
   
Public Finance 
        
Average pension payment (%) - -36.4 -25.2 -13.3 -20.5 -9.8 
     - low skill  (%) - -40.3 -27.4 -18.8 -22.9 -17.4 
     - med skill  (%) - -36.3 -25.1 -13.8 -22.6 -13.6 
     - high skill  (%) - -34.5 -23.7 -11.7 -23.1 -13.1 
Average Worker SSC rate 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 
     - low skill 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 
     - med skill 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 
     - high skill 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Average lifetime pension (Ben.-Contrib.)/Ben.      
     - low skill 43.6 7.8 53.1 25.4 1.9 1.9 
     - med skill 22.6 -17.7 36.7 11.7 1.6 1.7 
     - high skill -5.8 -51.6 22.1 1.6 -3.7 -3.7 
Average Labor Income Tax rate 15.6 15.6 26.8 17.8 -10.1 12.5 
     - low skill 9.6 9.6 20.8 11.8 -16.1 6.5 
     - med skill 15.7 15.7 26.9 17.9 -10.0 12.6 
     - high skill 22.4 22.4 33.6 24.5 -3.3 19.2 
  
  
   
Legend: DE NRR = Counterfactual pension system in Austria with Germany Net pension Replacement 
Rates; GDP/capita, consumption/capita and pension payment figures in 2060 are provided relative to 
the growth trend. (%) variations for the DE NRR & Aging and the DE NRR & Ret Age scenarios are 
provided relative to the DE NRR scenario. See also table 1. 
Source: simulations with IHS TaxLab Model 
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The second column (labelled DE NRR) displays the economic equilibrium if Austria had the 
same pension net replacement rate as Germany today, to be compared with the current 
equilibrium in the first column (labelled ISS). Because the pension replacement rate is 
lower10 and the average pensions are 36% smaller, the incentives to provide labor decline: 
pensions in Austria are strongly tied to past wage revenues; if pensions decline, the overall 
return to the provision of labor (wage before retirement; pensions after retirement) 
decreases, a disincentive to provide labor. However, households react by increasing own 
savings to finance consumption after retirement, leading to an average 10% increase in 
assets per capita and nearly 2% increase in consumption per capita.  
The fourth column (labelled DE NRR & Aging) adds population aging and scheduled pension 
reforms11. Outcomes are to be compared to the Aging scenario with the current replacement 
rates, in the third column (labelled Aging). Since the net replacement rate is lower in the 
fourth column, aggregate pension expenditures increase less with aging, reducing the need 
to increase labor income taxes (18% instead of 27%, in average). The financing impact of 
aging is thus less detrimental to labor supply incentives in the fourth column, leading to 
better GDP outcomes (-0.9% -9.5% instead of -13.4%). 
The sixth column (labelled DE NRR & Ret Age) adds retirement age reforms so that 
redistribution is removed from the pension system over the long-run and a NDC system is 
implemented. This is the case when the average lifetime contributions for the pension 
system equals the average lifetime benefits received, within each skill class. Outcomes are 
to be compared to the Aging and retirement age reform scenario with the current 
replacement rates, in the fifth column (labelled Ret Age). The scenario in the sixth column is 
the same as the scenario in the fifth column except we assume that the Austrian pension 
system starts with the same replacement rate as in Germany and that pension benefits are 
reduced at the same (lower) speed as scheduled for Germany. 
As before, the interplay of NDC systems and labor supply incentives define the 
macroeconomic impacts of the reforms. The needed increase in retirement age for the low-
skilled households to get a NDC balance in the sixth column is smaller than in the fifth 
column (64.2 years instead of 68.6) because replacement rates are lower in the first case. As 
a result, aggregate labor supply decreases in the first case (from 839 to 786 yearly hours per 
capita instead of 850 to 896 hours), and so does GDP (-0.9% -5.0% instead of +12.2%). 
From a policy reform perspective, experiments show that the implementation of a NDC 
pension system through variations in retirement age in Austria would be more attractive if it 
                                                     
10
 The current Austrian values for the net replacement rates are 91%, 90% and 69% for the low-, middle- and high-
skilled classes in the calibrated model, in line with figure 1. With German values, the rates are 55%, 57% and 46% 
respectively 
11
 For consistency, the scheduled pension benefit variations follow the Germany case (-13.3% drop of the 
replacement rate between 2010 and 2060) rather than the Austrian case (-21.8%), as done in other scenarios. 
Source: Ageing Working Group (2012). 
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was combined with an alignment to German pension replacement rates. In this case, the 
required increase in effective retirement rate for the low-skilled would be the realistic 64 
years mark (instead of 69 years) in 2060, which is one year below the current statutory 
retirement age (65 years for males). 
 
3.2.2. Macroeconomic and distributional consequences 
For some reforms implementing NDC systems, low-skilled households gain (in absolute 
terms or relative to other households) while they lose with other reforms. I consider two 
reform examples with different consumption impacts for low-skilled households: pension 
benefit variations and retirement age variations (see table 1). These theoretical reforms 
implement NDC systems and eliminate redistribution from the pension system. To 
compensate low-skilled households, I consider twomore realistic reforms which do not 
eliminate redistribution, but (partially) shift it from the pension system to the tax system, and 
evaluate their macroeconomic impact. In the first reform, pension benefit variations are 
associated with lump-sum transfers to the low- and medium-skilled households and lump 
sum taxes on the high-skilled households so that average consumption per capita is equal 
across skill classes. In the second reform, retirement age variations are associated with a 
combination of labor income tax and lump sum tax reforms so that average per capita 
consumption is identical for all skill classes. 
Table 4 provides the outcome of these redistribution-shifting reforms, with a constant 
population (columns 3 and 5). For convenience and comparison, I include the redistribution-
eliminating reform (columns 2 and 4), taken from tables 1. 
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Table 4: Pension benefit and tax reforms for a NDC pension system 
  ISS Cuts Cuts & Ret Ret 
   Shift Age Age & 
     Shift 
 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
 
Demographics 
         
Population (15+) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Dependency Ratio 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 
    
Labor Market 
        
Effective retirement age 59.4 59.4 59.4 62.8 62.9 
     - low skill 57.8 57.8 57.8 66.0 66.0 
     - med skill 59.1 59.1 59.1 63.1 63.4 
     - high skill 61.8 61.8 61.8 59.3 58.6 
Unemployment rate 5.5 5.1 5.5 5.1 4.6 
Participation rate 55.4 55.7 55.4 60.3 60.4 
Work hours (yearly hours / worker) 1,623 1,628 1,623 1,624 1,627 
Effective employment (yearly h. / capita) 850 861 850 929 938 
Gross wages (%) - -0.4 0.0 -1.9 -3.0 
    
Macroeconomics 
        
GDP/capita (%) - 1.4 0.2 7.7 8.0 
Consumption/capita (%) - 2.6 1.9 14.0 14.9 
     - low skill  (%) - -1.8 1.9 32.3 14.9 
     - med skill  (%) - 1.9 1.9 7.6 14.9 
     - high skill  (%) - 6.2 1.9 22.8 14.9 
Assets/ capita (%) - 5.3 7.0 16.5 19.5 
      
Public Finance 
        
Average pension payment (%) - -18.8 -19.9 7.1 7.3 
     - low skill  (%) - -43.0 -44.1 8.9 12.1 
     - med skill  (%) - -22.3 -23.3 3.0 0.6 
     - high skill  (%) - 3.6 2.1 8.4 12.6 
Average Worker SSC rate 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 
     - low skill 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 
     - med skill 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 
     - high skill 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Average lifetime pension (Ben.-Contrib.)/Ben.      
     - low skill 43.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     - med skill 22.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
     - high skill -5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average Labor Income Tax rate 15.6 9.9 13.5 6.2 1.8 
     - low skill 9.6 3.9 7.5 0.2 19.8 
     - med skill 15.7 10.0 13.6 6.3 -8.8 
     - high skill 22.4 16.7 20.3 13.0 25.2 
      
Legend: See table 1. 
Source: simulations with IHS TaxLab Model 
The third column (labelled Cuts & Shift) shows the outcome of the redistribution-shifting 
reform of pension benefits. Compared to the redistribution-eliminating reform in the second 
column (labelled Cuts), output gains are smaller (+0.2% instead of +1.4%) but of similar 
order of magnitude. By design, consumption per capita variations are identical across skill 
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classes (+1.9%), rather than heterogeneous (-1.8% for low-skilled and +6.2% for high-skilled 
households in column 2). The reform thus achieves the goal of a long-term sustainable NDC 
pension system with identical consumption gains for all households, at a moderate 
macroeconomic cost.  
Outcomes along other economic dimensions are similar for the two reforms. The reason for 
the similarity of outcomes is that households adjust saving behavior after a reform. In the 
redistribution-eliminating reform (second column), low-skilled households increase their 
savings to compensate for the reduction in pension benefits and maintain consumption over 
their lifetime: assets per capita increase more than 10% for the low-skilled, and less than 1% 
for the high-skilled (unreported). This saving behavior adjustment mitigates the loss due to 
cuts in pension benefits. Even if this adjustment does not neutralize the loss (1.8% drop in 
consumption), it is a significant contribution (to be compared with the 43% cut in the 
benefits). Moderate lump-sum redistribution in the redistribution-shifting reform (third column) 
is thus sufficient to neutralize the loss due to pension cuts, leading to similar outcomes12. 
The fifth column (labelled Ret Age & Shift) provides the outcome of the redistribution-shifting 
reform of retirement age. Compared to the redistribution-eliminating reform in the fourth 
column (labelled Ret Age), output gains are greater (+8.0% instead of +7.7%). By design, 
consumption per capita gains are identical across households (+14.9% in Ret Age & Shift 
case), a favorable comparison for medium-skilled households (+7.6% in Ret Age case). This 
reform thus implements a long-term sustainable NDC pension system with identical 
consumption gains for all households, for a small macroeconomic gain.    
Additional simulations (not reported here) show that conclusions hold when population is 
aging. 
In policy design terms, the experiment shows that adverse distributional effects due to the 
implementation of a NDC pension system (via pension benefit variations) can be eliminated 
if the pension reform is associated with a reform of the tax system, partially shifting 
redistribution from the pension system to the tax system, at no or a small macroeconomic 
cost. 
 
                                                     
12
 In the redistribution-shifting case (column 3) the pension cuts for the low-skilled are slightly higher (-44% instead 
of -43%). Because lump-sum transfers increase the outside option of low-skilled workers, their bargained wage is 
higher in relative terms, which increases the imbalance further in the pension system (gap between lifetime benefits 
and contributions), unless pension benefits are cut further. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
Population aging poses a long-term financing challenge for old-age social security 
expenditures, namely pensions, healthcare and long-term care. Reforms have already taken 
place in recent decades. Further reforms are needed over the long-run.  
The study shows that the implementation of a NDC pension system, which removes entirely 
redistribution from the pension system and ensures its long-term financial sustainability, has 
adverse distributional consequences. The analysis also shows that one can combine 
pension and tax reforms to implement an NDC pension system without adverse distributional 
impacts. The study did however not consider what level of redistribution is desirable. To 
identify the most promising reform scenario, further analysis would be necessary to consider 
different overall redistribution scenarios.    
Among the various reform options, increases in retirement age lead to larger gains in output 
and consumption for all households, including low-income households. Whether gains in 
output and consumption are the main goals of pension reforms, or not, is a question which is 
not addressed in this report. 
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